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Inthis paper, we present a micro estimate detennining taxable income as a function of
gross income and all major deduction options depending on ho~sehold and asset
categories. It is shown that tax savings strongly increase with ulcreasing income,
resulting in a decreasing effective marginal tax rate for the highest income groups. We
compute a lower bound on 1983 aggregate income tax losses' to the German fiscal
authorities of DM 72b, or of 45 % of wage and income taxes paid in 1983. The
estimate oftax loss exceeds estimates for other countries by orders ofmagnitude.1. Introduction
"Two things are unavoidable: taxes and death", tells us a proverb. A contrasting
view on tax avoidance, is offered by the public finance theorist. Collecting the
theoretical evidence, Stiglitz (1985) argues that in a world with perfect capital
markets and astute tax payers, income taxes can be completely arbitraged away.
Whilst capital markets apparently are imperfect and tax payers not quite as
astute as supposed by neoclassical theory, we still expect to find some degree of tax
avoidance, in part via tax arbitragel , in part via outright tax fraud. In this paper, we
use micro data for Gennany unavailable heretofore to give empirical evidence on this.
To an extent unexpected to us, Gennans do avoid income tax payments; and this by
and large the more, the higher their pretax income. We show this by conducting an
analysis of the 1983 wave of the Gennan Income and Consumption Survey that
covers all households but about the top two percent ofthe income distribution.
Our basic Tobit estimate relates taxable income to household gross income.
Since in our data set income is recorded in detail by source, and since we have
sufficient infonnation on household demographic and wealth status, we are able to
control for the betterpart oftax write offs.
Our estimates suggest that effective marginal income tax rates are not only
substantially below the legislated ones inall income brackets covered by our data; but
also that the difference between legislated and effective income tax rates increases in
gross income, and that for the top quintile of income earners, effective marginal tax
rates even decline rather than increase.
More precisely, whilst the 1983 legislated marginal tax rate in Gennany
increased up to a maximum of 56 percent, the effective marginal tax rate obtained
from our micro estimates reaches a maximum of 34 percent at a gross annual income
ofabout DM 80 000.-, and declines thereafter the top 20 percent ofincome earners to
a level close to 30 percent. While the dramatically lower level of effective marginal
tax rates must be attributed to tax arbitrage and evasion, the decline in marginal tax
rates is due to tax write offopportunities, in particular from real estate that are, orcan
be exploited only by higher income households. After accounting forall tax write offs
and all deductions from taxable income the data allow for, we arrive at a loss in
federal income taxes due to both tax arbitrage and tax evasion ofabout 45 percent of
the total 1983 income tax proceeds, orDM 72billion from the households covered by
our data. For several reasons to be explained later, this is likely to be only a lower
bound to the true losses in federal income taxes incurred in 1983 by the Gennanfisc.
For the purposes of this paper, we define by tax arbitrage the exploitation of tax generated
pricedifferences through simultaneous purchases and sales.
1In addition to this central resultt our estimate suggests that real estate ownership
is an important contributor to tax shelter and arbitrage; that unreported interest
income is heavily contributing to tax fraud; and that (agricultural) self employment
status apparently is a contributorto both. The reasons are roughly as follows:
While Gennan owner occupants ofhousing cannot tax deduct mortgage interest
payments aSt for instancet in the U.S.t they are given rather sizeable tax. write offs on
the value of their home. By contrastt owners of rental real estate can write off their
mortgage interest paymentst and in addition are allowed to deduct portions of botht
value and investment. Held against the income from real estatet these deductions
eventua~yresult innegative income that is tax. deductible from employment income.
Interest incomes are taxed in Gennany (subject to an allowance). Howevert
taxes were not drawn at the source in 1983. Up to now, bank laws have limited the
fiscal authorities' right to check the accurateness of reported interest income. Hence
interest income goes largely unreported.
Finally, the selfemployed are given rather generous tax write offpossibilities on
inputs into their business activities. Controls by the fiscal authorities on what is
declared as inputs into their income generating activities are limited. In additiont the
self employed can evade tax payments by transferring income and debt between
business and household activities ina way unobseIVed by the tax authorities.
To the best of our knowledge, we present here the first micro estimate on the
extent, cmd the sources of tax arbitrage and evasion for Gennany.2 Its sheer
magnitude invites policy reactions. We will comment on theset and on the relevant
literature in the concluding section of this paper. In section 2 t we describe our data
base. Ourprincipal estimate is presented and interpreted insection 3. We estimate the
total tax loss in section 4, and qualify this estimate in detail. We conclude with
section 5.
2 Roberts (1984) provides an estimate of average German taxes by income on the basis of
grouped data from the 1978 German Income and Consumption SurveYt without controlling
for household specific effects.
22. Dataand Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis is based on the 1983 wave ofthe Income and Consumption Survey
(EVS) that includes a representative cross section of all West German households
with head ofGerman nationality and annual income net oftaxes below DM 300 000.
Thus the wealthiest, about 2 percent of the West German population are excluded.
There remain about 43 000households in the sample.
In addition to basic demographics, the data contain a detailed account ofincome
by source, wealth by asset categories, and household savings and expenditures. The
economic flow data are computed from diaries filed monthly over the entire year by
the sUlVeyed households. Recorded expenditures also include all tax payments by
category.
Our analysis concentrates on households with head ofage below 66. The reason
for excluding the aged is that inasmuch as they are retired, they contribute only little
to income tax proceeds for institutional reasons: only the revenue component oftheir
retirement income is taxable. Thus in 1983, the aged declared on average only 10% of
their gross income as taxable, effectively yielding a contribution of a mere DM 7
billion to income tax proceeds totalling DM 142 billion gross ofchurch taxes (drawn
by the state on behalf of the churches). Thus, excluding the aged works against our
demonstration that the relationship between gross, and taxable income is substantially
blurred3.
Comparisons of weighed aggregates of the EVS with national accounting data
reveal that total income from dependent employment, transfer·and pension incomes,
and income from agricultural self employment are approximated very well, but that
income from non-agricultural self employment is underreported by about 39 percent.
Also, depending on asset categories, monetary asset incomes are underreported by 40
to 70 percent.4 By contrast, comparisons with data collected by the federal tax
authorities reveal that tax payments are reported very accurately. We will return to
these comparisons in the evaluation ofourtax loss estimate at the end ofsection4.




We have chosen to exclude the aged rather than the retired, in order to avoid an endogeneity
bias in our estimate.
This figure includes monetary assets incomes of the two percent richest households not
included in our sample.
3Table 1
Descriptive Statistics ofthe Sample Population
Size 17.422.309







No children living with household 56,63 %
One child 22,82 %
Twochildren 15,42 %
Three ormore children 5,13 %
Monthly grossincome below DM 1000 2,98%
DM 1000 - DM 1999 9,61 %
DM2000 - DM 2999 13,64 %
OM3000 - OM 3999 16,90 %
DM 4000 - DM 4999 16,16 %
DM 5000 - DM 9999 36,11 %
DM 1ססoo+ 4,59%
Avera~emonthly ~oss income 4.868,41 DM
Dependentemployed (without civil servant) 60,90 %
Civil servant 9,44%
Selfemployed agricultural 2,17 %
Selfemployed non-agricultural 6,45 %
Unemployed 2,99%
Outoflaborforce 18,06 %
Renters withoutreal property assets 50,89 %
Renters with real property assets 3,15 %
Owners without other real property assets 34,89 %
Owners with otherreal property assets 11,07 %
No monetary asset income (above allowance) 63,48 %
Monetary assetincome (withoutdividends, above allowance) 36,52 %
Average assetincome ofmonetary
assetholders (above allowance) 544.59 OM
Source: EVS 1983, weighed sample.
43. An Empirical Model ofTax Evasion in Germany
The estimate central to our analysis involves the relationship between household
gross income as the independent, and taxable income as the dependent variable. The
latter is computed by inverting the income tax function and inserting the household's
income tax payments, while accounting for single vs. jointfiling. As tax payments are
recorded very accurately, little infonnation is lost with this. computation. However,
one should keep in mind that current tax payments are reported in the EVS. As all
dependent employees' taxes are withheld at the source, these reflect their taxable
income of the current year. The taxable income so computed is inflated by the
deductions declared when filing the income tax return. In 1983, tax rebates onexcess
taxes withheld in 1982 amountedto DM 8.3 b netofbackclaims.
Conversely, the recorded tax payments from self employment typically reflect
the previous year's taxable income,ifnot that ofan evenearlier year. In 1982 (1983),
incomes from selfemployment and from real assets increased nominally by about 3.8
(10.8) percent. Hence 1983 tax payments are based on a correspondingly lower
income. However, the resulting underestimation of taxable income should be held
against the underreported 39percentofgross income from selfemployment. We have
no estimate onthe extent to whichincomes from real assets were underreported.
First obselVations on the two income concepts and the relationship between
them are contained inTable 2.
Table 2 shows average household gross, and taxable incomes for households
ordered by gross income decile. It also gives tax payments over gross, and taxable
incomes, and finally the percentage of tax payers in each gross income decile. Not
unexpectedly the proportion of taxable to gross income increases monotonically
(col.7). However, the coefficientofvariation oftaxable income (col.6) is substantially
larger than that of gross income (colA), often by an order ofmagnitude of ten. Given
gross income as the order criterion, one must expect a larger coefficient ofvariation.
It is the orderofmagnitude ofthe difference that merits a latercomment.
At any rate, both coefficients ofvariation decline monotonically in gross income
deciles only until the eighth decile, but then increase. Finally, col.l0 (coLli) ofTable
2 shows that the average tax rate ifcomputed on the basis of gross income (taxable
income) obtains a maximum at only 17.26 (26.5) percent.
Table 3 gives the percentage of households per taxable income decile within a
given gross income decile.
The diagonal elements ofTable 3 show that withthe exceptionofthe top income
decile involving an open income ihtelVal,5 the relationship between the two orderings
is quite poor. While the lower offdiagonal elements are loaded rather heavily, the rest
5 It is a lSlatiStiCal regularity due to the openness of the highest income interval that the
percentage ofhouseholds belonging to the highest decile in both income measures turns large
again.
5Table2
Households byGross Income Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Gross Obser- Gross Income (YALL) Taxable Income (YTAX) Tax Payments (YTAX)
Income vations Decile Range Coeff. mean Coeff. YTAX/YALL mean Hhlds with TAX/YALL TAX/YTAX
Decile fDM] ofVar. [DM1 ofVar. r%l rOMl TAX>Of%1 f%1 f%l
1 1857 500- 20.800 0.272 2224.27 1.848 14.25 234.61 25.92 1.44 2.37
2 2281 20.800- 31.200 0.112 9622.20 0.955 35.45 1472.00 59.12 5.37 8.18
3 2699 31.200- 38.800 0.062 18783.54 0.533 53.35 3129.37 84.36 8.88 13.13
4 3293 38.800- 45.900 0.047 24170.64 0.407 56.90 4113.33 92.29 9.68 14.85
5 3789 45.900- 52.900 0.042 28500.57 0.344 57.76 4993.05 95.52 10.11 15.92
6 4129 52.900- 60.500 0.039 33163.00 0.323 58.53 081.53 96.80 10.73 16.96
7 4409 60.500- 69.300 0.039 38945.59 0.304 60.09 7494.87 97.83 11.55 18.09
8 4625 69.300- 80.600 0.043 45494.90 0.276 60.99 9264.37 98.90 12.41 19.41
9 4732 80.600- 98.400 0.058 54663.59 0.278 61.87 12190.44 99.33 13.77 21.33
10 4175 98.400-639.300 0.346 82581.88 0.517 62.26 24181.78 99.35 17.26 26.46
Source: EVS 1983, weighed sample
6-Table3
Percentage ofHouseholds ofTaxable Income Decile within Gross Income Decile
Gross TaxableIncome total
Income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 48.82 45.27 5.85 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 %
2 27.33 26.65 31.28 14.22 0.46 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 10.00 %
3 10.15 12.06 22.66 29.61 21.60 3.44 0.36 0.14 0.00 0.00 10.00 %
4 5.35 6.03 14.72 22.61 26.55 20.88 3.61 0.19 0.00 0.06 10.00 %
5 2.98 4.06 9.55 14.79 21.83 27.18 17.58 1.95 0.06 0.02 10.00 %
6 2.19 2.76 6.20 8.60 13.96 22.92 28.40 13.81, 1.11 0.04 9.94%
7 1.45 1.66 4.32 5.15 7.97 13.81 24.45 29.90 10.82 0.48 10.00 %
8 0.81 0.78 2.73 2.87 4.64 7.75 16.09 30.75 29.99 3.59 10.00 %
9 0.48 0.42 1.83 1.71 2.30 3.11 7.90 17.35 41.03 23.87 10.00 %
10 0.43 0.33 0.88 0.50 0.73 1.01 1.77 5.94 16.90 71.52 10.06 %
total 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 17422309
Source: EVS 1~83, weighed sample
7ofthe upper triangular elements is close to zero. By contrast, the load is much more
spread in the lower triangular elements. There is a systematic reason for this;
households in low gross income deciles cannot conceivably reside in very high
taxable income deciles. However, the substantially larger spread in the load of the
lower off diagonal elements also suggests that many households in higher gross
income deciles manage to substantially reduce taxable income, thus arriving in very
low taxable income deciles.
The infonnation provided so far does not really reveal any tax savings enjoyed
by the higher income groups. As Table 3 reflects only an ordering along the two
income scales, the higher income earners' relative tax savings could be substantial
evenifits diagonal elements would be loaded all the way up to 100 percent. Rather,
Table 3 together with col.'s (4) and (6) ofTable 2 on the coefficients ofvariation of
gross and taxable incomes, respectively, suggests a considerable degree ofhorizontal
inequity in income taxation: households blessed with similar gross incomes may end
up in quite different brackets of taxable income.6 Thus the relationship between the
two income concepts is blurred, and increasingly so with increasing income decile.
This calls into question the statement made by the Gennan (and other) tax authorities
that "taxable incomes ought to reflect the households'(relative) ability to pay".7
Inorder to arrive at a quantification ofthe relationship between the two income
measures and thus the tax savings enjoyed by the different household groups, we
specified econometrically household taxable income with household gross income as
the main independent variable. As in our sample about 10.6 percent ofall households
exhibit a computed taxable income of zero, we have chosen to account for this left
hand censoring within a Tobitestimate.
We added two important groups of independent variables. One group specifies
sources of incomes that are treated differently for tax purposes; and the other one
collects indicators of household status that have an impact on the household's tax
write offopportunities. Table 4 lists the variables and their defInitions.
6 This argument is reinforced by.the observation not tabulated here that the coefficient of
variation ofconsumption remains about half the level ofthat oftaxable income in the highest
gross income deciles.
7 See e~g. Tipke and Lang (1991, p. 197).
8Table 4
Variables entering the Tobitestimate and theirdefinitions
Dependent yarjable;
YTAX= household taxable annual income as computed from reported tax
payments, divided by 10000
Independent yariables;
YALL= total annual household gross income including social security
contributions (but the employer component), pensions and public
transfers, income from monetary and real assets, excluding revenues from
sales of household durables and irregular private transfers, divided by
100001)
YALL2= total gross income squared, divided by 1000 000
YALL3= total JUoss income cubed, divided by 10 000 000
Specific income sources: Income from employment
Employmentstatus dummy =a,ifhead ofhousehold dependent employed, notcivil servant
SELFEMP= 1 ,ifhead ofhousehold selfemployed non-amcultural
SELFEMPA= 1 ,ifhead ofhousehold selfemployed agricultural
CIVILSERV = 1 ,ifhead ofhousehold civil servant
UNEMP= 1 ,ifhead ofhousehold unemployed
NONLAB= I ,ifhead ofhousehold out oflaborforce
Specific incomesources: Incomefrom real and monetaryassets
Income from real assets variables =0 for renters notowning real estate
REALESTR= assessed value ofrental real estate owned by renters
REALESTON= assessed value ofreal estate owned by owner occupiers not owning other
real estate
REALESTOO= assessed value of total real estate owned by owner occupiers owning
rental real estate
YINTEREST= annual capital income net of capital gains, dividends and returns from
investment funds (computed from the reported value of monetary assets
by multiplication with the average lending interest rate per asset) and net
ofa tax allowance
Tax relevant household indicators
CHILD = number ofpersons below 18 living within household
CHILD2= number ofpersons below 18 squared
OTHERPERS= number ofpersons above 18 in household other than head and partner
Household status dummy = 0 ,ifhead ofhousehold married
UNMARRIED = 1 ,ifhead ofhousehold not married
SEPARATED = 1 , if head of household widowed, separated or permanently living
separately
SEX = 1,ifhead ofhousehold female
Othercontrol variables
AGE = age ofhead ofhousehold
RURAL = 1 , if household lives in a community more than 40 Ian away from next
city above 100 000 inhabitants
REGION = I ,ifhousehold resides in Southern Germany
1) While we did deduct operation costs involved in generating income from real estate, we were
not able to deductdepreciation and interestcosts because estimates on these would have been
too rough. We will later commenton the consequences ofthis.
9The inclusion of these variables can be justified as follows. Consider first those
indicating income from employment. Separating incomes from different kinds of
employment is important primarily because of differences in precautionary and other
expense allowances. In 1983, the base households receiving income from dependent
employment were entitled to a general allowance of about DM 1650 p.a., and in
addition itemized precautionary expense allowances up to a volume of DM 3500 plus
the difference (ifpositive) between DM 3000 and the employer contribution to social
security (9% ofgross income). The civil servants do not contribute to social security.
Thus in 1983 they could exploit the full DM 3000 deduction opportunity involved in
the lattercomponent.8
By contrast, the (non-agricultural) self employed could deduct DM 1200 as a
general allowance, and, by the above rule, up to DM 6500 for precautionary
expenses. In addition, the self employed could always tax deduct interest payments
by (not quite legally) shifting debits to their business activities.
The self employed in the agricultural sector rece.ive preferential tax treatment of
two kinds. First, a general deduction ofDM 2000 per adult from taxable income, and
second, a general deduction ofDM 2000 from their taxes payable.
Finally, both unemployment benefits and social security or (other) retirement
incomes go untaxed with the exception oftheir revenue component.
Let us now tum to the variables specifying incomes from real and monetary
assets. Separating owners of real estate into those owning their dwelling unit and
those owning other real estate is motivated by differential tax treatment. Households
living in owner occupied dwelling units cannot tax deduct mortgage interest
payments. However, in 1983 they were allowed to deduct annually five percent ofthe
value of their unit during the first eight years after purchase, and 2.5 percent
thereafter up to a cap ofDM 200 000 ofthe house value for single family homes, and
DM 250 ()()() for duplexes. A linear depreciation rate of two percent applied to all
values in excess ofthese caps.
By contrast, owners of rental real estate are able to deduct all mortgage interest
payments, and effective 1983 they could deduct for the first eight years 5 percent of
the purchase price for the building proper (not for the lot) and of the improvement
investment; 2.5 percent for the next six years thereafter; and 1.25 percent for
remaining 36years.
Also, owner occupiers could deduct investment only in energy saving devices at
a ten percent rate over ten years, while owners of rental real estate were able to
deduct all maintenance investment over the same period. Most importantly, income
earned from real estate canbecome negative, in view ofthe interest tax deduction and
8 For instance, by engaging in tax saving activites, such as in savings towards owner occupied
housing within the Gennan Bausparkassen System. See Borsch-Supan and Stahl (1991).
10the depreciation allowances.9 TIris negative income can be held against income from
other sources. Thus on average, tax savings should increase in the assessed·value of
real estate owned bytheindividual household.
Interest income is taxed up to a OM 400 a year allowance per adult. However,
as that income is not taxed at the source, a substantial share ofit remains unreported.
Ifreported, Gennan tax payers cannot discount this income against interest paid on
consumption credit.
We discuss now the tax relevant household indicators. Households with
children coulddeduct DM 432p.a. for eachchildbelow age of 18, and OM 1800 p.a.
as long fls that child was not living with the household while undergoing school, or
vocational training. For children between ages 18 and 27, deductions were OM 432,
while educational expense allowances were OM 2400 (OM 42(0) p.a. for children
living (not) at home. The standard allowance for precautionary expenses was DM 900
per child below age 16 (or up to age 27 ifundergoing vocational, or school training).
Finally, subsidies towards owner occupied housing were available only to households
with two or more children. This motivates the inclusion of both CHILD, CHILD2,
and OTHERPERS since the latter variable largely captures the children above 18
living with theirparents.
The base households, i.e. the married ones receive preferential tax treatment
relative to singles, by filing jointtax statements with their spouses. TIris tax advantage
obviously is not available to the UNMARRIED. By contrast, the SEPARATED can
dedm;t payments to childrennot living in their household. At any rate, the differential
application of tax rates is reflected in the function that determinates taxable income
from taxes paid.
The variable AGE is included to control for risk aversion, or experience effects
in tax evasion.
German tax law allows for a deduction of commuting expenses which on
average shouldbe particularly large for households living farther away from the major
employment centers. This motivates the inclusionofRURAL.
Finally, REGION should capture the fact that the proportion of assessed to
market values of real estate is, on average, 14,7 percent in Northern, and 18 percent
in Southern ~ermany. In both, current assessed values are based on 1964 estimates.
The difference arises from a much higher appreciation of real estate values in
Southern Germany.
Table 5 and Figure 1 indicate some ofthe discussed effects by giving figures on
incomes and taxes for the relevant household groups.
9 In a rather comprehensive accounting study on the tax shelter provided by real estate,
Bartholomai (1991) collects OM 10 b (OM 17 b) of tax relevant personal incomes from real
estate for 1977 (1986), that were held against an estimated OM 17 b (OM 50 b) of tax
relevant losses.
11Table 5
Incomes by household groups
Gross Income Taxable/ Tax Payments/
Gross Gross Income
Mean (DM) Coeff. ofVar. Income (%) (%)
Dependent emp10ved 62.481 0,478 62,94 12,27
Civil Servant 67.766 0,412 65,63 13,40
Selfemployed non-a~cultural 92.924 0,689 50,97 11,89
Selfemployed agricultural 61.174 0,412 22,62 3,44
Unemployed 30.495 0,707 28,07 4,11
Out oflabour force 31.822 0,774 16,68 2,38
Renters withoutreal property assets 44.446 0,551 54,26 10,23
Renters with real property assets 80.908 0,533 57,88 13,07
Owners without other real property assets 68.740 0,486 50,41 9,83
Owners with otherrealproperty assets 83.737 0,609 46,30 9,74
No-monetary assets income>allowance 51.392 0,571 51,25 9,42
Monetary assetincome>allowance 70.640 0,589 53,71 11,35
Without children (& otherpersons) 45.485 0,702 50,13 9,99
With children 67.682 0,519 53,59 10,23
Urban 58.633 0,622 53,17 10,52
Rural 57.852 0,571 49,41 9,07
Unmarried or separated 35.919 0,731 43,40 9,15
Married 68.265 0,507 55,98 10,55
All households 58.421 0,609 52,15 10,13
Source: EVS 1983, weighed sample
ObselVe that the non-agricultural selfemployeds' gross income is on average 50
percent higher than that of the dependent employees, but that the spread of their
income is considerably higher. By contrast, the share of their taxable income is
substantially lower. Amongst the employed, that share is lowest for the agricultural
selfemployed, with about 23 percent. They also enjoy by far the smallest share oftax
contributions amongst the employed.
Similarly, the owners without other real property assets have command over 55
percent more gross income than the corresponding renters, yet their share of taxable
to gross income, and correspondingly taxes paid to gross income is substantially
12lower. lbis difference becomes extreme when comparing the owners with other real
property assets with the renters without these assets.
Figure 1
























Our Tobit estimate based on the variables described in Table 4 is presented in
Table 6.
13 Bibliothek
ties Instituts fur WeltwirtschaftTable6
Detennination oftaxable income
Parameters Estimates t-Statistic %-change in response to a
change
CONST -0.221681 -1.732 --- ---
YALL. 0.890980 21.062
YALL2 -1.359037 -3.702 + 12.8 by 10%
YALL3 0.288642 3.829
SELFEMP -0.609450 -9.787 - 16.4 from 0 to 1
SELFEMPA -2.187478 -32.268 - 58.4 from 0 to 1
CIVILSERV 0.035472 2.714 + 1.0 from 0 to 1
UNEMP -0.852809 -16.140 - - 23.0 from 0 to 1
NONLAB -1.666366 -48.675 - 42.5 from 0 to 1
REALESTR -0.053226 -5.076 - 6.8 from 0 to 4.7 1)
REALESTON -0.057766 -16.358 - 6.4 from 0 to 4.2 1)
REALESTOO -0.082764 -10.032 - 15.0 from 0 to 6.8 1)
YINTEREST -0.687544 -5.625 - 2.7 from 0 to 0.152)
CHILD -0.260505 -13.926 - 9.5 by one child
CHILD2 -0.033005 -5.279
OTHERPERS -0.344768 -28.535 - 9.3 bv one person
UNMARRIED 0.061140 2.036 + 1.7 from 0 to 1
SEPARATED -0.293122 -9.338 - 7.9 from 0 to 1
SEX -0.029395 -1.168 - 0.8 from 0 to 1
AGE -0.006201 -9.035 - 1.7 by 10 years
RURAL -0.075917 -5.110 - 2.0 from 0 to 1
REGION -0.036822 -2.916 - 1.0 from 0 to 1









1) Mean of assessed values (divided by 10.000) of real property owned by the respective
households
2) Mean ofinterest income (divided by 10.000) above allowance of households receiving interest
income above allowance
Source: Computed from EVS 1983, ufiweighed sample
14The overall perfonnance measures indicate a very good fit ofthe estimate.10 All
variables with the exception of the constant and of that controlling for the head of
household's sex are significantly different from zero and, as we will argue in the
sequel, with the expected sign except that for CIVILSERV. A significant influence of
SEX would clearly not correspond to the Gennan tax schedule, nor to expectations
about differences in tax evasion.
Quite obviously, gross income is in all tenns a highly significant predictor of
taxable income. Ifall variables are evaluated at their means, a ten percent increase in
gross income leads to a 12 percent increase in taxable income. However, the
significance ofboth YALL2 and YALL3 suggests that in contrast to the legislated tax
allowances, tax shelter is not independent ofgross income.
All but one of the dummies characterizing the sources of employment income
(SELFEMP, SELFEMPA, UNEMP, and NONLAB), show up with the expected
negative sign. The exception is CIVILSERV. Recall that the civil servants do not
deduct the employer contributions to social security from taxable income. Therefore,
their itemized tax write off opportunities out of the DM 3000 component are larger
than those for the other dependent employees. Our estimate indicates that they are not
used to the extent possible. Observe also that the dummies reflecting agricultural self
employment and non-labor outweigh the others by orders ofmagnitude. For instance,
relative to the dependent employees, the agricultural selfemployed endowed with the
same income are able to reduce their taxable income by 58 percent.
Similarly, the group of variables reflecting incomes from real and monetary
.assets (REALESTR, REALESTON, REALESTOO), are all negative with the
expected relative orders of magnitude. Thus the tax shelter is highest for the owner
occupiers owning additional real property: On average, their taxable income is
reduced by 15 percent. With an average of 2.7 percent, the reduction in taxable
income enjoyed from unreported interest income is comparatively small. However, as
discussed above, this is entirely due to underreporting.
In order to appreciate the contribution of reported marginal interest income to
taxable income, observe that such a marginal unit does not only increase
YINTEREST but also YALL. Therefore, its total impact on taxable income consists
of the negative coptribution of /!1YINTEREST (= -.69) and the positive contribution
of /!1YALL (= +.74) (evaluated at DM 70.000 the mean gross income of interest
income recipients). It follows that the net contribution of the marginal DM in interest
,income adds a mere DM .05 to taxable income!
The variables reflecting the number ofchildren in the household do demonstrate
the substantive tax shelter allowed for by Gennan tax law. While carrying the
significant expected sign, the dummy reflecting the disadvantage ofsingle tax filing is
with 1.7 percent surprisingly small, compared to the 7.9 percent reduction in taxable
income enjoyed by the separated, due to their tax write offopportunities.
10 Dhrymes Pseudo R2 is the squared correlation coefficient between the observed and the
estimated value of the endogenous variable computed only for observation with positive
values. McKelvey-Zavoina's Pseudo R2 as modified by Veall and Zimmermann (1990) is the
measure ofgoodness-of-fit yielding best prediction for the OLS R2 ofthe uncensored sample
in the Monte Carlo-studies by Veall and Zimmermann.
15We attribute the significant negative sign on the age variable to increasing
experience in saving tax payments. The RURAL dummy sighificantly shows the
influence of commuting allowances in reducing taxable income. Finally, REGION
corrects with the expected sign for the North-South difference in assessed values as
predictors ofthe marketvalue ofreal property assets.
Figure 2 indicates the aggregate effects of tax shelter and tax evasion
differentiated by gross income. The dotted line shows marginal tax rates as a function
ofgross income under the assumption that taxable income equals gross income minus
the standard deductions. While this reflects only the extreme version ofthe legislated
tax rates, it nonetheless can function as a benchmark case. The shaded line gives
marginal tax rates if all controls accounting for deductions from taxable income are
evaluated at their means. The heavily drawn line finally shows effective marginal tax
rates without any controls for tax deduction opportunities.
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Figure 2 shows quite impressively that both effective marginal tax rates, the one
controlled for special allowances and the one uncontrolled for, are located way below
the legislated one. Furthermore, the gap between legislated and effective marginal tax
16rates increases. Most surprising is the fact that the effective marginal tax rate if
uncontrolled for special allowances does not increase monotonically, but decreases
from a gross income ofabout DM 84000 on! Hence out of every additional income
earned, the richest households in the sample (which are not even the richest
households in the German economy) pay less taxes than the households earning
income justabove the sample mean!
Especially in view ofthis rather striking result, one may question the robustness
of our estimate. In order to test for this, we have run several variants of this,
especially accounting for its most sensitive components, namely reporting errors in
selfemployment and real asset incomes, and consequently biases in our estimate due
to the fact that both the selfemployed, and the real asset owners are all located in the
higher income strata.
Inview ofthe fact that we could not observe net income earned from real estate
property, we have run an estimate based on gross income net ofthese earnings. There
is no qualitative difference to the results presented here except for an upward shift in
both controlled and uncontrolled effective marginal tax rate functions by 2.5 and 5
percent, respectively. We also performed an estimate including additional variables
interacting both real estate ownership and non-agricultural self employment with
income. In the former case, the additional variables turned out to be insignificant. In
the latter case, the interaction was weakly significant and positive, but its inclusion
did only marginally change the parameters of the original estimate. All of this
indicates that the results presented here are quite robust against alternative
specifications.
4. Estimating total Tax Losses
We now use our Tobit estimate ofTable 6 to calculate the loss in income taxes
incurred in 1983 by the German federal government. Towards this, we assume that
the parameters' on all controls but the self employment status dummies and the
monetary asset variable do indeed reflect the correct use ofthe legislated tax write off
opportunities available to the respective households. We then compute aggregate
taxable income and taxes (per household) under the assumption that over and above
the deductions controlled for, the households maximally exploit the legal deductions
available given their employment status. The relevant computations are summarized
in Table 7.
17Table7
Estimation ofIncome Tax. Loss
TaxableIncome Tax Proceeds
(YTAX) (TAX)
Total DM Total DM
(DMb) per hhld (DMb) per hhld
(1) Observed values 589.6 33800 127.6 7300
(2) Unconditional forecast oflatentvalues 560.9 32200 123.1 7 100
(3) = (2) with BYALL = 1, 755.8 43400 190.1 10 900
BYALL2 = BYALL3 = 0
(4) = (3) with BYINTEREST = 0 762.4 43800 192.5 11050
(5) = (4) with BSELFEMP = 0 767.5 44050 194.4 11 150
(6) = (5) with BSELFEMPA = 0 774.3 44450 195.3 11200
(7) = (6)-(2)=Estimated total loss 213.5 12250 72.2 4150
Source: Computed from EVS 1983, weighed sample.
Row (2) ofTable 7 contains the forecasts oftotal taxable income and taxes paid
on the basis of our estimate, under the assumption that taxable income may also
assume negative values. This is obtained by deleting the downward censoring of the
dependent variable. The reason for doing so is that we wish to experimentally dismiss
different forms oftax shelter. This may have two effects we wish to replicate here. It
always increases predicted taxable income; but it may also lead to a change of status
from not paying to paying income taxes.
Thus, row (3) predicts taxable income and tax proceeds under the assumption
that after exploiting all standard tax write off opportunities reflected in the controls,
all additional gross income contributes one for one to taxable income. This would
increase taxable income by DM 195 b, and tax proceeds by DM 67 b. "
Row (4) adds to this the assumption that all interest income beyond the ftrst tax
free DM 400 per adult is contributing in full to taxable incomy. This leads to a further
increase in taxable income ofDM 6.6 b, and oftax proceeds by DM 2.4 b. Similarly,
removing tax shelter from the non-agricultural self employed beyond the legislated
allowances (row (5)) would increase taxable income by DM 5.1 b and tax proceeds
by DM 1.9 b. A similar move on the agricultural self employed would increase
taxable income by DM 6.8 billion and tax proceeds by DM .9 billion.
The last row of Table 7 reflects the sum of all losses in taxable income and tax
proceeds. In particular, after correcting for all tax write offs that are identiftable
within the context provided by our data, we estimate a total tax loss of DM 72.2 b.
18Per head of the households considered in our sample, this amounts to OM 4 150 in
taxes underpaid in 1983.
Table 8 disaggregates this tax loss by household gross income deciles. Not
unsurprisingly, the tax losses increase strongly with increasing decile, and peak at
DM 15 713, or almost 12 percent of gross income lost per annum from the income
earners in the highest decile.
Table 8
Tax Loss per Household and Gross Income Decile
Gross Income Average Tax Tax Loss in % of











Source: Computed from EVS 1983, weighed sample
The remainder ofthis section serves to qualify our Tobit estimate as the basis for
calculating aggregate income tax losses, and to evaluate our quantification of these.
Towards the former, we computed the sumtotal of standard allowances available
according to the 1983 German wage and income statistics to the (agriculturally) self
employed, and compared this to forecasts on the basis of our Tobit estimate without,
and with correction for these allowances. We arrived at a nearly perfect fit between
computed and forecasted volume of allowances for the agriculturally self employed.
A similar calculation for the non-farm self employed led to an excess of0.9 billion of
forecasted over the computed sumtotal of allowances for the self employed non-
agricultural. That difference is easily explained by the fact that our Tobit based
forecast includes all households with positive income from self employment, whereas
the value computed from the wage and income statistics is restricted to households
with selfemployment as the major income source.
19We ffually discuss the question whether our figure of OM 72.2 billion over- or
underestimates the true tax losses the German government suffered in 1983.
As to factors contributing to overestimation: We cannot control for (borderline)
legal tax arbitrage opportunities involving monetary assets, of the type suggested by
Raab (1992). However, as in 1983, income from monetary assets went uncontrolled
by the fiscal authorities, there was little incentive to exploit these. We are also not
able to control for itemized special deductions. However, many of these are at the
legal borderline. At any rate, they should be more than compensated on average by
our assumption that the limits for itemized standard deductions are fully exploited.
The weakest component of our estimate is clearly the tax loss from the self
employeds' income. It is inflated due to the fact that their tax payments reflect earlier
years' lower incomes, and that we were unable to account for backward or forward
roll overs from preceding or consecutive years in case these years' tax returns had
involved negative taxable income. II
In evaluating this, recall that. this group's income is underreported by 39 percent
relative to the national income accounts. By contrast, tax payments are reported
accurately, relative to the wage and income tax statistics. In our view, underreported
income alone should more than compensate for the overestimation involved in basing
our measure of taxable income on taxes paid on earlier years' incomes. Mter all, the
tax loss we attribute to income from agricultural and non-agricultural employment
amounts to merely OM 2.8 b or less than 4 percent ofthe computed total tax loss.
At any rate, these should be the only important components contributing towards
overestimating the tax loss. Quantitatively much more important are aspects
contributing to its underestimation. A first one is that we were unable to include tax
rebates in our estimate. In 1983, tax rebates net ofback claims amounted to OM 8.3b.
While these are added to our households' gross incomes, they are also not deducted
from the taxes paid. Therefore, taxable incomes as computed from tax payments are
inflated by more than the household gross incomes are.
Second, we have incorrectly assumed in our calculation that counterfactually the
self employed households would maximally exploit of itemized standard deductions
up to the limits applicable to them, and for this reason would pay less taxes than we
observe them to do. Third, by controlling our estimate for real estate assets, we have
implicitely considered legal all tax savings resulting from those assets.
Fourth, recall that interest income is underreported in our survey on average by
more than-50 percent relative to the national accounts, and\that virtually all of this
income illegally goes untaxed. Further on this, the national account figures do not
include the incomes from monetary assets deposited by Germans in other countries; in
particular in Luxembourg and Switzerland.
II A similar argument could be made with respect to tax losses incurred from owners of rental
real estate. However, our real estate variables should fully control for their deduction
possibilities, and we did not call these into question within our simulation.
20Fifth, the national account figures do not include incomes generated from black
market activities.. Kirchgassner (1983) estimates a size of the German shadow
economy for 1980 of 10.3 percent of GNP, implying OM 155 000 b that went
untaxed.
Last but not least, the two percent richest households are not included in our
calculation of tax losses. However, by sweeping generalization from our Tobit
estimate, these should be the strongest tax savers. In conclusion, we are most certain
that our tax loss figure is an extremely conservative estimate of the true loss in
income tax payments suffered in 1983 by the German fisc.
5. Concluding Remarks
Since the incipient paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the theoretical
literature suggests that rational individuals attempt to avoid tax payments; and this the
more, the higher their income. This can be done by exploiting sometimes elaborate
tax arbitrage opportunities (Stiglitz (1988), ch. 24) and/or by outright tax fraud
(Cowell (1990)). In the current tax legislation at least of Germany, the borderline
between the two is not clear cut. 12
Rather than trying to fix this borderline, we have provided ari empirical estimate
of the magnitude and the distribution of both income tax arbitrage and evasion in
Germany. We have based our estimate on evidence from the 1983 Income and
Consumption Survey, by computing taxable household income from tax payments and
comparing it to reported household gross income, while accounting for household and
asset specific tax write off opportunities. To the best of our knowledge, the indirect
approach we have chosen here to estimate tax losses is novel in the literature.
A central result is that in 1983 effective marginal tax rates do not increase
monotonically in gross income, but decrease in the upper two income deciles of our
sample households. In addition, the gap between legislated and effective marginal tax
rates widens in gross income. The distributional consequences of this are obvious: At
least around 1983, income taxation did not work as intended by the fiscal authorities,
but was g~ossly inequitable.
We also have shown that interest income goes largely unreported, and if
reported, contributes only marginally to taxable income. This together with negative
income from real assets is largely responsible for the decrease in marginal tax rates.
Based on our estimate we computed OM 72.2 b as a lower bound ofthe sum total of
tax losses suffered by the German fisc in 1983.
12 What is deemed illegal is decided by the courts on particular cases, and is then adopted in a
case law mode.
21Unquestionably,.our estimate of taxes lost, as any on this difficult subject, is
loaded with difficulties. Major ones are that not all income is reported in our survey;
that we cannot perfectly relate tax payments to income ofthe same year; and that we
cannot exhaustively account for all legal tax write offopportlll!ities.
However, Cowell (1990) and most recently Webley et al.(199l) compare other
methods of estimating the magnitude of tax evasion, and convincingly conclude that
each one of them poses problems on the correct inference of tax evasion that are at
least as serious as the ones arising from our estimate. The evaluation of our estimate
at the end of section 4 suggests that the ballpark figures presented by us are rather
robust, and deftnitely at the low end of the expected volume of taxes lost by the
German government in 1983.
How does our estimate compare to those of the literature? The ones closest in
spirit are based on data provided by the U.S. American Internal Revenue Service. We
look fIrst at estimates of total taxes lost, and then at micro details. Slemrod (1990)
reports on estimates by the Internal Revenue ServiG.e (1988), according to which in
1987 noncompliance with the individual and corporation income tax cost the Treasury
over 20 percent oftax liability. Our estimate oftaxes lost for Germany is substantially
higher, we estimate losses only on individual income tax proceeds and obtain a tax
loss of 45 percent oftax liability. The reasons for this large difference are unclear at
present. It may be that the American tax auditors are only able to observe smaller
portions of (untaxed) gross income than is reported in our anonymous survey. There
may also be cross national differences in tax compliance. Finally, the incentives in
two tax systems may differ.
There are many micro studies analyzing IRS data, mostly emphasizing the
effects of alternative auditing rules on tax compliance13. Our objective was much
more moderate: We simply intended to describe the incidence and the magnitude of
tax arbitrage and evasion. Yet some ofthe results are comparable. Closest in spirit is
Clotfelder (1983). He shows that the marginal tax rate has a signiftcant effect on
underreporting, an effect that is at least not refuted by our estimate. A similar result is
reported by Slemrod (1985). By contrast, both Clotfelder's and Slemrod's estimates
suggest increasing tax compliance with increasing age, whereas tax compliance
decreases with age in our estimate. Also in contrast to our result, the existence of
interest and dividend incomes (together with that of wages) is associated with better
compliance in Clotfelder's estimate. This should be of little surprise, as in contrast to
Germany, taxes on interest and dividends are withheld at the source in t~\e U.S.
It remains to discuss some policy implications of our results. When comparing
the results for Germany and the U.S., the clear difference in the impact of interest and
dividend income on tax compliance suggests taxation at the source also in Germany.
Adopting such a measure would be short sighted, however. Figure 3 shows that in
1983, net purchases by Germans offoreign investment certificates were close to zero,
and purchases of foreign fixed interest securities amounted to merely DM 6 b , but
that in 1988 and 1992 purchases reacted dramatically to different modes of
withholding taxes on incomes from monetary assets, the first one of which was
13 e.g. Clotfelder (1983), Crane and Nourzad (1986), Dubin et al.(1987, 1990), Slemrod (1985),
or Witte and Woodbury (1985)
22revoked three months after its inception (NohrbaH & Raab (1990». Thus the 1988
and 1992 attempts to modify the modes ofdrawing taxes from this income resulted in
a massive export ofmonetary assets. Such exports can never be kept under control in
a geographically integrated country such as Germany.
Figure 3
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However, our estimate together with Figure 2 suggests that there were (and still
are) severe distributional consequences involved in the mode of taxing income. In
particular, we show that the marginal tax rate is regressive in the highest income
classes. Apparently the negative redistributive impacts are the result of a large
number of partial tax write off measures that may even be rational if working in
isolation, together with the fundamental problem that incomes from different sources
are easy to conceal. Therefore income is not an ideal tax base. In sum, our results hint
towards fundamental reform that eventually leads away from income towards
consumption as the more appropriate tax base.
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